By S.T. Salah, 23/2/26

This audit examines the role of Israeli Jewish religious institutions, settlement yeshivot, and allied Christian Zionist networks in shaping anti-Palestinian ideology from 1948 to 2026.
After 1967, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook and his followers framed the occupation as fulfilment of divine promise. The Gush Emunim movement transformed this theology into a settlement programme treating Palestinian presence as an obstacle to redemption.
Rabbi Meir Kahane’s Kach movement openly promoted expulsion of Palestinians and entered the Knesset in 1984. Although banned in 1994, its teachings continued in religious institutions whose alumni later entered government coalitions.
After the 1994 Hebron massacre, rabbis publicly praised the perpetrator Baruch Goldstein and his grave became a pilgrimage site. Religious glorification of violence continued through halakhic texts such as Torat HaMelech, which argued that killing non-Jews, including children, could be permitted in wartime. Investigations produced no convictions and the text continued circulating.
State-funded rabbis used official platforms to promote racial hierarchy. Senior rabbis declared non-Jews existed to serve Jews and that Arabs should accept subordination or leave. Municipal rabbis issued letters urging Jews not to rent homes to Arabs; investigations produced no indictments.
Settlement yeshivot became hubs of radicalisation. Rabbis endorsed “price tag” attacks on Palestinian villages and invoked the biblical concept of Amalek. Youth from these communities later participated in attacks such as the Duma arson killings.
Christian Zionist networks added international religious support. Organisations such as Christians United for Israel mobilised political lobbying, settlement funding, and mass rallies framing expansion and war as divine mandate while largely ignoring Palestinian suffering.
Military religious structures also played a role in spreading religiously framed hostility toward Palestinians. The Israel Defense Forces Military Rabbinate expanded its influence over soldiers’ education from the 2000s onward. Investigations by Israeli journalists and NGOs documented the distribution of religious pamphlets during the 2008–2009 and 2014 Gaza wars describing the campaigns as sacred missions and urging soldiers not to show compassion toward the enemy population. Military chaplains delivered battlefield sermons referencing biblical wars and divine promise, indicating institutional acceptance of religious language in combat settings.
Religious nationalist youth movements and pre-military academies became important transmission channels. Dozens of religious preparatory academies expanded rapidly from the 1990s onward and now train a large proportion of combat officers. Studies by Israeli sociologists show that graduates of these academies are heavily represented in elite combat units and settlement leadership. Curricula in several institutions emphasised Jewish sovereignty over the entire land and framed Palestinians primarily as adversaries, strengthening the integration of religious nationalist ideology into military culture and decision-making.
Settlement expansion was closely linked to religious funding networks. Donations from religious charities and diaspora organisations supported settlement infrastructure, yeshivot, and religious tourism in the West Bank, while pilgrimage programmes brought thousands of visitors annually to settlements framed as biblical heritage sites. Religious political parties gained sustained influence over education, settlement policy, and policing, allowing religious leaders to shape legislation and public discourse.
The audit concludes that Israeli religious institutions functioned as a parallel authority system, producing theological justifications that normalised dispossession and violence and contributed materially to the entrenchment of apartheid and territorial expansion.