S.T. Salah, 20/02/26
This audit examines how Israeli military, intelligence, and civil authorities developed and implemented surveillance systems under Israeli occupation from 1948 to 2026. It evaluates the legal authorities, doctrines, and technologies used to collect and apply personal data in regulating Palestinian mobility, residency, employment, healthcare access, and political activity, assessing how surveillance became embedded as a governing method rather than a limited security practice.
Checkpoint documentation shows that biometric scanners and closed circuit camera systems were deployed in West Bank cities including Hebron, Bethlehem, Qalqilya, and Jenin and at crossings between the West Bank and Israel. By the mid 2010s facial recognition hardware was operational at multiple checkpoints including Hebron’s Checkpoint 56 and Tel Rumeida entries, as documented by B’Tselem, Amnesty International, and UN OCHA. Soldiers photographed Palestinians, including children and elderly, and entered the images into databases determining whether they could pass, be detained, or be questioned. Israeli settlers passing the same areas were exempt.
In occupied East Jerusalem, the Mabat 2000 camera grid was established around 2000 and later expanded. Hundreds of cameras were positioned in Muslim, Christian, and Armenian quarters of the Old City, covering markets, alleys, schools, and entrances to the Haram al Sharif compound. By the late 2010s the system incorporated facial recognition supplied by private vendors and linked to a central police command. Residents reported that children walking to school were continuously recorded. Pilgrims and worshippers from abroad were monitored without notice or consent. Camera networks were extended toward Palestinian neighbourhoods including Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah alongside intensified settler activity.
Population databases were consolidated after the 1967 occupation. Israel created central registries linking family information, residency status, marriage, birth, and address changes to permit and movement systems. Palestinians could not alter basic life events without Israeli approval. By the 2000s these registries incorporated biometric identifiers and were integrated with permit platforms deciding access to work, medical care, and border crossing. Al Haq and Addameer documented cases in which travel for medical treatment was denied or delayed after registry data showed past imprisonment, political activity, or family association. The criteria were opaque and non appealable.
Digital interception expanded during the Second Intifada. Israeli intelligence units collected telephone, SMS, and internet communications at scale. Unit 8200 veterans later confirmed that intimate personal information was gathered and stored for coercive leverage, including sexual orientation, health records, financial distress, and family disputes. The information was used to pressure Palestinians into collaboration, particularly those seeking medical permits, travel documents, or family unification. Human rights organisations documented instances where Gaza patients seeking cancer treatment through Erez crossing were asked to provide information on relatives or neighbours as a condition for travel.
Facial recognition and predictive arrest programs became routine by the late 2010s. Systems known publicly as Blue Wolf and Red Wolf were deployed in Hebron and other West Bank cities. Soldiers photographed Palestinians in the street and at checkpoints, creating digital files that displayed colour coded alerts. A green signal permitted passage, yellow triggered questioning, and red authorized detention. Amnesty International and Breaking the Silence documented soldiers describing quota systems for photographing Palestinians to build database density. Individuals who refused photography were detained. Families reported children refusing to walk to school due to repeated scanning.
Border crossings functioned as data capture sites. At Allenby Bridge, all Palestinian passengers were required to undergo biometric scans, questioning, and luggage searches. At Erez crossing into Gaza, patients and traders were questioned about family members, political affiliation, and social media activity. OCHA documented prolonged delays for medical referrals, including cases where children with congenital heart disease were denied permission to exit Gaza for surgery. Data obtained during crossings was linked to security files determining future permits and movement.
Surveillance extended to speech and political expression. Israeli cyber units monitored social media platforms. Palestinians were arrested for online posts deemed supportive of resistance or critical of Israeli policy. In 2015 Israeli police detained East Jerusalem children for Facebook activity. During 2023 to 2025 Gaza operations, digital rights groups recorded large scale removal of Palestinian content and coordination between Israeli authorities and platforms to suppress documentation of civilian harm. Hebrew language incitement received lower moderation.
Surveillance was discriminatory. Israeli settlers in the West Bank were not subjected to biometric enrollment, checkpoint face scanning, or predictive risk scoring. Surveillance architecture mapped Palestinian life as a field for intervention and coercion while exempting settlers living on the same land.
Accountability was absent. Palestinians had no means to access, correct, or delete their data. No independent oversight reviewed accuracy, bias, or misuse. Decisions determining travel, healthcare, work permits, and detention were executed without disclosure of evidence or criteria.
The audit concludes that Israeli surveillance produced a continuous record of Palestinian presence, movement, and association across decades. Data collected for “security” was repurposed for coercion, family pressure, and punitive restriction. Israeli occupation surveillance did not end after arrest or interrogation. It continued throughout daily life, making Palestinian existence observable, legible, and vulnerable to intervention by institutions operating with full discretion and without reciprocal transparency.